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The Formative Period of First
Amendment Theory, 1870-1915
by ALEXIS J. ANDERSON*
The constitutional grant could not have been simpler: the Fram-
ers needed just ten words to codify America's free speech ideal. Yet
the stark brevity of the First Amendment is inherently deceptive.
Couched within that naked license lie definitional complexities
which have confounded the nation's legal elite ever since 1791. De-
spite this legal ambiguity, the prevailing historiography of free
speech can be briefly summarized. The broad libertarian potential of
the First Amendment was never realized by antebellum America;
more than a century later a rash of repressive antisocialist legislation
spawned debate and test cases which laid the groundwork for the
post-World War I doctrinal development of a mature free speech
principle.' Perhaps it is the disarming simplicity of this theory which
is both perplexing and troubling. Clearly the trilogy of 1919, which
found Justice Holmes writing for the majority in Schenck,'
Frohwerk, 3 and Debs4 did mark the first prolonged onslaught by free
speech advocates at the Supreme Court level. 5 And the first treatise
devoted to free speech was published the following year. When
Professor Zechariah Chafee of Harvard Law School undertook the
* Member of the firm of Duane, Morris, and Heckscher, Philadelphia, Pennsyl-
vania. The author wishes to thank Professor Charles McCurdy, University of
Virginia.
I. See, generally, Paul Murphy, The Meaning of Freedom of Speech (Connecticut,
1972). See also, Gerald Gunther, "Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First
Amendment Doctrine," 27 Stan. L. Rev. 719, 720 (1975) (commenting on the dearth
of free speech histories). One notable exception, cited by Gunther, at 723, n.14, is
David Rabban's "The Meaning of the First Amendment in the Generation Before
World War One," (unpublished seminar paper, 1974), which has proved a valuable
secondary source.
2. Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
3. Frohwerk v. U.S., 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
4. Debs v. U.S., 249 U'.S. 211 (1919).
5. Ernest Freund. "The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech," 19 New Republic 13,
14 (May 31, 1919), reprinted in Harry Kalven, "Ernest Freund and the First Amend-
ment Tradition," 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 235, 240 (1973) (concluding that only prior
censorship was constitutionally suspect before Holmes' Abrams dissent). Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY
task of writing Freedom of Speech, he was struck by the paucity of
legal material.
The cases are too few, too varied in their character and often
too easily solved, to develop any definite boundary between
lawful and unlawful speech .... Nearly every free speech deci-
sion .. .appears to have been decided largely by intuition. 6
Like Chafee, most commentators have dwelt only on federal court
developments.
Those critics who have placed the roots of free speech doctrine
in the post-World War I era have a ready explanation. Paul Murphy,
the leading modern analyst of the legal history of free speech from
the War to the New Deal, has acknowledged only a handful of pre-
1915 national issues which tested the bounds of democratic rhetoric
when confronted with vocal minority sentiment: the embodiment of
the libertarian ideal in the Bill of Rights, the challenge posed by
Federalist prosecutions under the Alien and Sedition Acts, and the
trials of Copperheads and abolitionists censored for pamphleteering.
The logical inference of such a portrait is that First Amendment
values escaped regular governmental check. Murphy characterized
the early twentieth century American as unschooled in the First
Amendment, concluding:
Freedom of speech had been an operational reality largely out-
side the area of either legal definition from the adoption of the
Bill of Rights until World War I. It was generally accepted as a
tradition and a practice, although it had few public guaran-
tees .... Thus, freedom of speech was treated as a dearly won
prize, but not used from day to day .... I
According to most critics from Chafee to Murphy, America entered
World War I with the practical bounds of free speech doctrine still to
be defined.
This study suggests that the current geneology of First Amend-
ment doctrine is far too abbreviated. 8 Rather than hypothesize a
6. Zechariah Chafee, Freedom of Speech (New York, 1920), 16.
7. Murphy, supra, n.i, 100.
8. It is admitted that our modern libertarian notions did not arise from Anti-
Federalist philosophy. As Leonard Levy has persuasively argued in his seminal
work, The Legacy of Suppression, post-Revolutionary Americans grappled more
with delineating federal-state boundaries than defining the parameters of the First
Amendment. Leonard Levy, The Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and
Press in Early American History (Cambridge, 1960). See also, John Roche. "Ameri-
can Liberty: An Examination of the Tradition of Freedom," in Milton Konvitz and
Clinton Rossiter, Aspects of Liberty (Ithaca, 1958), 129 at 135. ("One finds few
earmarks of libertarianism ... in early American society.") The partisan debates
over the Alien and Sedition Acts, combined with their politically opportune use by
the Jeffersonians themselves, amply attest to the lack of principled free speech pro-
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mature First Amendment theory springing into full blown existence
after 1916, this study would interpose a middle period running from
Reconstruction until World War I when free speech ideals were first
systematically repressed by arbitrary enforcement of municipal or-
dinances. To suggest that an earlier period nurtured free speech
advocates is not to embrace a monolithic vision of the Amendment's
development. Indeed contemporary case law and official action re-
veal a mixed bag: some noteworthy protection, some notorious re-
striction. But it was from 1870-1915 that a new concept of freedom of
speech developed which freed it from the mainstream of democratic
privileges. From that period forward, the principle would remain
intimately connected with the protection of minority rights. Clearly
there was an evolution underway in the meaning and scope of the
liberty, a process that has continued to the present.
Support for this periodization comes from material largely ig-
nored by previous commentators. To reconstruct the formative pe-
riod of First Amendment theory requires an analysis of more than
just Supreme Court decisions and Congressional enactments. Since
formal incorporation of the strictures of the First Amendment into
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause did not occur until
the 1920s, 9 this review explores state as well as federal develop-
ments. Therefore the rubric of "First Amendment theory" must be
broadened to encompass local as well as national contributions,
whether derived specifically from the Bill of Rights or from similar
state constitutional protections. Once the case law sample includes
litigation spawned by state and municipal repression of civil liber-
ties, a new chapter in the history of free speech can be written.
Actually it should not be surprising that post-Reconstruction
America was a fertile period for raising free speech concerns: the
socio-economic disruptions of that era were ripe for challenges to
First Amendment guarantees by a variety of minority groups. The
broad value consensus which had characterized the antebellum
scene was supplanted by post-War class conflict. Urbanization, in-
dustrialization, and immigration fueled the breakdown of America's
homogeneity in the late nineteenth century.1 0
tection as America entered the nineteenth century. U.S. v. Hudson & Godwin, I 1
U.S. 32 (1812). Even though our initial premises are consistent, however, this essay
suggests that the social dislocations of the late nineteenth century fostered a fertile
period for raising free speech concerns.
9. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
10. Robert Wiebe's The Search for Order (New York, 1967), chronicles this de-
mise of eighteenth century rural Americana, peopled by Jefferson's yeomanry, and its
transformation into the social welfare state which typifies the modem collectivist
nation. Labor unrest, an influx of immigrants, and influential party bosses irreparably




In the country's search for mechanisms to stablize the new
social order, society reassessed the antebellum model of unfettered
exercise of individual rights.'" The new found strength of the state's
regulatory arm jeopardized free speech guarantees. By 1919 Roscoe
Pound found that, individual liberty had to be subordinated to the
public interest. "We are forced to admit," he wrote,
that wise engineering may hold down free self-assertion in many
situations and is not bound as a condition of right existence to
leave all men free to contract enterprises with the minimum of
restriction to keep the peace.
1 2
Thus these newly usurped state powers, coupled with the shattered
value consensus characteristic of urban America, boded ill for the
vindication of First Amendment freedoms when invoked by minor-
ity dissidents.
But it was this social milieu that spawned the numerous test cases
where minorities, claiming repression, asserted their First Amend-
ment rights. By confronting the public with their free speech con-
cerns, these nineteenth century individuals were instrumental in
hammering out the principles behind a mature theory for protecting
the free speech guarantee during the twentieth century. Part I of this
article will review the contradictory thoughts of contemporary
academics on free speech, and Part II will address the extent to
which political speech won both recognition and protection from
majoritarian pressure.1 3 Once the ambit and level of free speech
protection during the formative period is revealed,' 4 the need for
historical revision will be apparent.'
11. Id., 12, 100, 102, 105, 170-1, 136, 146; Harold Hyman, A More Perfect Union
(Boston, 1975), 385, 391, 402, 397-8; John Roche, Quest for the Dream (New York,
1963), 8-40. The organizational impulse and bureaucratic vision noted by historians
like Wiebe and Harold Hyman served to aggrandize the government's role. But see
Morton Keller, Affairs of State (Cambridge, Mass., 1977) (Society's consensus had
been weakened at least but not destroyed.)
12. Roscoe Pound, "The Administrative Application of Legal Standards," 4 Re-
ports of the ABA (1919), 450.
13. Lillian BeVier, "The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into
the Substance and Limits of Principle," 30 Stan. L. Rev. 299, 300 (1978). For conven-
ience, I shall adopt her definition of political speech:
Speech that participates in the processes of representative democracy and
does not in principle protect either advocacy of violent overthrow of the govern-
ment, incitement to unlawful acts or non-political speech.
14. These labels and approach to First Amendment analysis are suggested in Harry
Kalven, "The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment," 1967 S. Ct. Rev. 267, 278,
295 (1967).
15. 1 wish to clarify at the outset that this investigation does not encompass libel
law, religious toleration, obscenity prosecution, or freedom of the press
adjudications.
1980
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY
I. ACADEMIC DEBATE
Zechariah Chafee intimated in Freedom of Speech that his gen-
eration was the first to articulate free speech issues. Yet by Chafee's
own admission he has had no interest in free speech prior to a new
teaching assignment in 1916 and thus assumed his contemporaries
were equally remiss.1 6 Actually the enthusiasm of others, legal schol-
ars and popular commentators alike, had been kindled earlier. Writ-
ing a history of civil liberties for the ACLU, Leon Whipple remarked
that the generation before 1917 witnessed a flowering of free speech
debate. The signs of such increased awareness included guarantees
provided by new state constitutional provisions (such as Oklaho-
ma's 1908 amendment); formation of the Free Speech League in
1911, followed by other similar legal defense groups; devotion of an
entire annual meeting of the American Sociological Society to the
issue; investigation of academic freedom by the newly formed
American Association of University Professors and reports by the
recently convened Industrial Commission on the status of civil liber-
ties.' 7 Thus, rather than the anticipated dearth of academic discus-
sion, quite a lively debate raged both through the law reviews, and in
the popular journals where men of various libertarian persuasions
aired their views.
A review of the constitutional theory of one nineteenth century
legal giant, provides an apt departure for this synopsis of contem-
porary academic sentiment. In his Treatise on Constitutional Limi-
tations, which first appeared in 1868, Thomas Cooley devoted an
entire chapter to the liberties of speech and press. Among the first to
note that each state's constitution contained some equivalent of the
First Amendment guarantee, Cooley wrote in an oft-quoted passage
that free speech was "almost universally recognized not only as
highly important, but as being essential to the very existence and
perpetuity of free government.'' 8 Impressed by its common law
origins, 19 Cooley proposed and persuasively defended a seemingly
libertarian protection for political speech going far beyond the nar-
row Blackstonian notion of freedom from prior restraint:
But while we concede that the liberty of speech . . . does not
imply complete exemption from responsibility for every thing a
16. Zechariah Chafee, Thirty-five Years with Free Speech (New York, 1952), 2.
17. Leon Whipple, The Story of Civil Liberties in the United States (New York,
1927; reprinted, 1970), 327.
18. Thomas Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations (7th ed., 1903),
5960.
19. Id., 604. By thus differentiating between a public right and private wrong,
Cooley cofild justify legal remedy for libel suits while, promoting political debate.
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citizen may utter, it is nevertheless believed that the mere
exemption from previous restraints cannot be all that is secured
by the constitutional provisions inasmuch as of words to be
uttered orally there can be no previous censorship. 0
Cooley, when read literally, would have permitted unbridled license
for speech with the important caveat of subsequent responsibility for
injury caused by false, malicious, scandalous, blasphemous or
obscene speech.21 Even if limited to the sphere of political discus-
sion, Cooley's interpretation of the free speech guarantee offered
much guidance to his generation: it identified the public character of
the free speech liberty; it rejected a literal textual approach to the
First Amendment (i.e., this natural right was never meant to encom-
pass some utterances like obscenity, libel, blasphemy); and it pro-
scribed governmental regulation of, or subsequent punishment for,
purely political speech.22
Cooley had launched the era's free speech debate on a most
theoretical plane. Following events such as the Haymarket riot
which put the guarantee to the practical test, other commentators
stopped well short of embracing an absolutist position. In 1887, a
contributor to the Albany Law Journal found "no shibboleth more
absurd than the cry of free speech." ' 23 Although that analyst would
have punished those who merely advocated the commission of a
crime and would bar peaceful assemblies which obstructed public
streets, 24 a contemporaneous editorial in the Dailey Register drew
the line at punishment for only those crimes actually instigated by
the speech.2 5 The editors of Case and Comment, in announcing the
devotion of an entire issue to free speech, concluded:
That there is or can be an absolute right of free speech may well
be doubted. If it denigrates into slanderous vituperation or
seditious harangue it loses its dignity and its privilege.
26
Defamation, obscenity, and sedition clearly lay outside the protec-




23. Note, 36Alb. L. J. 421 (1887).
24. Id.
25. Id., citing the Dailey Register editorial at 421.
26. "Coming in November Free Speech Issue," 22 Case & Comment viii (Oct.
1915). See also, William Ackerly, "Constitutional Freedom of Speech and of the
Press," 22 Case & Comment 457, 460 (Nov., 1915). ("It is the golden mean between
these two untolerable extremes [oppression and license] which our fundamental law
as interpreted by the courts seeks to maintain.")
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of their discussion concerned whether additional governmental
interests might tip the scale against free speech.
The previous catalogue of free speech sentiment does not
exhaust the wealth of libertarian dialogue in the generation before
World War I. Though never representative of the majority view, the
advocates of the extreme absolutist position further broadened the
scope of First Amendment rhetoric. The Yale Law Journal carried
one diatribe which found the restraints posed by modem agencies to
be more severe than any Russian scheme for repression and a major
contributor to the current decay of personal rights.27 A member of
the New York bar singled out instead the rampant police power as
the most pernicious threat to individual liberties by describing the
inherent tension between majoritarian regulation and minority val-
ues.
2 8
Perhaps no critic better personified the absolutist position in the
free speech struggle than Theodore Schroeder whose works pro-
foundly influenced the course of free speech theory. This activist,
whose seminal essay, Free Speech for Radicals, appeared in 1916,
lamented the judicial treatment of First Amendment values. 29 Sec-
retary of the Free Speech League, founded in California in response
to the San Diego free speech fights of 1911, he was allied with
agitators like Emma Goldman. The national policy of the organiza-
tion became opposition to all government restrictions of free expres-
sion. 30 Out of these events, Schroeder culled an early libertarian
definition of free speech, remarkably consistent with our modern
conception:
I do not mean the right to agree with the majority but the right to
say with impunity anything and everything which anyone
chooses to say and to speak it with impunity so long as no actual
material injury results to anyone and when it results then to
punish only for the contribution to that material injury and not
for the mere speech itself.31
Chiding many of his liberal friends who would place socialist dogma
and obscenity outside the Amendment's protection, Schroeder cited
English conservatives in support of his position. 32
27. Richard Byrd, "The Decay of Personal Rights and Guarantees," 18 Yale L. J.
252, 253-4 (1907).
28. James Morton, Jr., "Free Speech and Its Enemies," 22 Case & Comment 471
(Nov., 1915).






Devising a legal protection for mere advocacy of admittedly
criminal behavior proved his central concern. Schroeder asked,
"Can a man under our Constitution guaranteeing liberty of speech
and press be properly punished for his fruitless advocacy of
crime?" 33 Rejecting any legal standard which punished mere words,
he felt that even seditious sentiments must be tolerated.3 4
Schroeder's solution may have been novel for his generation; how-
ever, he and his contemporaries shared the search for a principled
theory of free speech that could shield a minority from majoritarian
excesses.
By the eve of World War I, Roscoe Pound summarized the
period's consensus on the extent of the freedom of public discus-
sion. Rejecting the extremes of prior repression and unfettered
license, Pound outlined a balancing standard: "the social interest in
the free development of the individual must be weighed with the
social interest in the state as a social institution." 35 He reflected the
era's concern with mob violence, but proposed time, place, and
manner restrictions as the only constitutionally permissible restraint
on protected speech. 36 Chafee in his treatise proposed a similar test
which drew heavily upon the pre-War debate: a society's legitimate
interests in order and self-protection outweigh individual expression
"close to the point where words will give rise to unlawful acts." 37
From these various expressions of the balancing test, Justice
Holmes would lead the Supreme Court to a limited protection for
even potentially incendiary political speech through the medium of
his pliable "clear and present danger" standard. 38 Though the direct
influence of Chafee on this legal transformation has been noted, 39
the seminal influence of the earlier legal commentators must now
also be recognized.
The debate had stretched the breadth of the legal spectrum.
Some critics preached government repression, other unbridled
license. But well before World War I a vocal minority already clas-
33. Theodore Schroeder, "On Suppressing the Advocacy of Crime," I Mother
Earth 7, 13 (Jan., 1907).
34. Theodore Schroeder, "Historical Interpretation of Freedom of Speech and of
the Press," 70 Cent. L. J. 184, 185 (1910).
35. Roscoe Pound, "Interests of Personality and Honor," 28 Harv. L. Rev. 445,
455 (1915).
36. Id.
37. Chafee, supra n.6, 38.
38. See Frank Strong, "Fifty Years of Clear and Present Danger: From Schenck to
Brandenburg and Beyond," 1969 S. Ct. Rev. 41 (1969); Yosal Rogat, "The Judge as
Spectator," 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 213 (1964).
39. Fred Ragan, "Justice 0. W. Holmes, Jr., Zechariah Chafee, and the Clear and
Present Danger Test for Free Speech," 58 J. Amer. Hist. 24 (1971).
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sified the core value of free speech-political expression-as invio-
late. Furthermore the free speech advocate now branded the state
and its various regulatory arms, from agencies to courts, the poten-
tial source for oppression. Lastly, while opinion differed on which
types of utterances were to be protected, punishment for its abuse
became the emerging standard. Having sampled the range of the free
speech debate, the stage is set for analysis of the relecant case law.
II. MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES
Early in the formative period, a state Supreme Court found the
leaders of the Industrial Alliance (IA), an anarchist workers' al-
liance, guilty of conspiracy to commit murder as a result of the 1886
Haymarket riot. In Spies v. Illinois,40 the co-defendants were
charged and ultimately sentenced to hang not for murder but for
their utterances. Their convictions met with popular support. Henry
Adams' article "Shall We Muzzle the Anarchists?" concluded that a
society which permitted peaceful redress of grievances need not
countenance their terrorism. "Free discussion does not contemplate
such license to press and speech as will endanger the peace and
tranquility of the community." 41
"Haymarket" and subsequent cases involving the state police
power reveal two issues which demanded legal resolution: first,
what was the scope of the free speech guarantee (i.e., what types of
utterances belonged within the ambit of protected speech) and, sec-
ond, even if the expression could be protected, what state interests
existed which outweighed individual rights (i.e., in balance, the ex-
tent to which protection could be afforded). To map out the judicial
solutions to these puzzles, a survey of political speech cases follows.
Confrontations between free speech advocates and the police power
in the guise of municipal ordinances will be reviewed to shed light on
the era's understanding of the most fundamental aspect of the free
speech guarantee.
A. Police Power in Theory
The 1960s left us with memories of clashes between local offi-
cials attempting to enforce municipal ordinances and free speech
advocates protesting the Vietnam War. Similarly post-
Reconstruction America, marked by its own social dislocations,
witnessed the continuing tension between the police power and First
Amendment guarantees. Though the era produced many legendary
40. Spies v. Illinois, 122 II. 1 (1887).
41. Henry Adams, "Shall We Muzzle the Anarchists," I Forum 445, 448-9 (1886).
Vol. XXIV
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court battles, we should begin by sampling the ideas of its legal elite
on the extent of local police power. I
Few commentators, would have objected to John Dillon's 1873
assessment of the extent of a municipal corporation's regulatory
power:
Our city governments usually possess the power either by ex-
press grant, or by virtue of their authority, to make bylaws
relating to the public safety and good order of their inhabitants.
42
Eugene McQuillen seconded Dillon's view, noting that reasonable
municipal ordinances falling within the realm of delegated legislative
power had uniformly received judicial affirmation. 43 Probably the
leading treatise writer of the period on the subject of the police
power, Christopher Tiedeman, acknowledged that constitutional
prohibitions were no absolute bar to the enforcement of local regula-
tions since "permissible restraints upon the freedom of speech and
of the press are not confined to responsibility for private injury. 44
But a caveat was in order: such infringement on individual liberty,
especially when cloaked in official discretion, required a close nexus
between the means employed and the intended goal of promoting the
public welfare. 45 Thus in 1881 one lawyer was conscious of the pos-
sible pretextual uses of the police power and demanded that local
regulations have for their "immediate object the promotion of the
public good." 4
6
Under the guise of the state police power, local officials pro-
tected the public's health, safety, and morals through various con-
42. John Dillon, Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations, §326 (2nd
ed., New York, 1873), 423.
43. Eugene McQuillen, "Validity of Municipal Ordinances Vesting Discretion in
Public Officials or Departments," 65 Cent. L. J. 2, 6 (1907).
44. Christopher Tiedeman, A Treatise on the Limitations of Police Power in the
United States §81 (St. Louis, 1886), 192, 67; see also H. G. Wood, A Practical
Treatise on the Law of Nuisance §741 (Albany, 1875), 773.
45. Id., Eugene McQuillen, "Some Observations on State Laws and Municipal
Ordinances in Contravention of Common Rights," 64 Cent. L. J. 209, 212 (1907). See
also, Mayor of Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217, 228 (1878) (oft-cited case which
voided the mayor's licensing authority over steam engine construction). "It has been
well said in reference to such general grants of power that as to the degree of neces-
sity for municipal legislation on the subjects thus committed to their charge, the
Mayor and City Council are the exclusive judges while the selection of the means and
manner . . . of exercising the power which they may deem requisite to the ac-
complishment of the objects of which they are made the guardians, is committed to
their [state legislatures'] sound discretion."
46. W. P. Wade, "Subjection of Private Rights to Police Power of the State," 6
South. L. Rev.. 59, 63 (n.s.) (1881).
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trol mechanisms. These legal theories included: prosecution for
nuisance 41 or breach of the peace, 4 censorship boards, and licensing
schemes.4 9 Society's general acceptance of the reasonableness of
official discretion irked Lincoln Steffens, organizer of the Free
Speech League. He admonished his contemporaries: "Any censor-
ship by authority is unsatisfactory .... Free speech always becomes
an acute issue when a spirited people realize that they haven't free
speech. And we Americans haven't it." 50 While not all observers
were so caustic, none could have helped but be impressed by the
continuing strength of the police power arsenal, armed to protect the
public safety, health, and morals. 51
B. Police Power in Practice
Having highlighted the academics' opinions on minority dis-
sent, it should come as no surprise that individuals asserting a con-
stitutional right to a public forum faced stern local opposition. As
McQuillen summarized:
Although the right to speak freely in public or private is suffi-
ciently guaranteed by fundamental law, the privilege of deliver-
ing sermons, lectures, addresses and discourses in the streets
and other public places may be restricted ... if in the discretion
of the constituted public authorities the public welfare demands
it; and such exercise of the police power is a legal restraint on
the liberty of the individual. 52
47. See for example, City of Rochester v. West, 64 N.Y. 510 (1900) (prosecution of
billboard owners for nuisance). See, also, the numerous trials of disseminators of the
Sunday Sun, a midwest scandal sheet: State v. Van Wye, 136 Mo. 227, 37 S.W. 938, 939
(1896); Strohm v. People, 160 I11. 582, 43 N.E. 622 (Ill. S. Ct. 1896); In re Banks, 56
Kan. 242, 42 P. 693 (Kan. S. Ct. 1895); Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
48. See, for example, City of Glasgow v. Bazan, 96 Mo. App. 412, 415 (Kansas
City Ct. Apps. 1902); St. v. Russell, 45 N.H. 83, 85 (1864); Bonnville v. St., 53 Wis.
680 (1882). But see, City of St. Charles v. Meyer, 58 Mo. 86 (1874) (conviction of
wedding party serenaders reversed on grounds of implied consent to breach of
peace); Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 584 (1889) (conviction of local prostitute
overturned on insufficient evidence). See generally, Benjamin Dean, "Curfew Ordi-
nances and Constitutional Law," 4 Law Notes 107, 110 (1900).
49. Mutual Film Co. & Industrial Common of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 243 (1915),
affing, 215 F.138 (N.D. Ohio 1914) (censorship board); Commonwealth of McGann,
213 Mass. 213, 215 (1913) (licensing scheme). But see, Dailey v. Sup. Ct., 112 Cal. 94,
97 (1896) (injunction of scandalous play denied on free speech grounds).
50. Lincoln Steffens, "Letter to Editor," 25 Everybody's 717 (Nov., 1911) (re-
sponse to editor Erman Ridgeway's editorial which called for the ban of two current
New York City plays as indecent) 25 Everybody's 575 (Oct. 1911).
51. Whipple, supra n.20 274-5.
52. McQuillen, supra n.48 at 212-213.
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Editorials in the Evening Sun and Outlook expressed similar reser-
vations about the extent of the guarantee in practice.53
The cases confirmed the presence of restraints on unbridled free
speech; indeed at first blush Steffans' charge seems all too apt.
While some libertarian rhetoric can be culled from dicta in U.S. v.
Cruickshank,54 or state court opinions, 5 the bulk of dd-cisions ulti-
mately rejected free speech defenses. The Salvation Army parade
cases are both legal and representative. Some courts summarily af-
firmed the local licensing, power under traditional police power
rationale where proper delegation of the state's authority to the
municipality existed.5 6 The proffered defenses of other Salvation
Army members were more creative. Eliza Mashburn unsuccessfully
challenged the Bloomington, Illinois anti-noise ordinance by assert-
ing her freedom of religion and speech. Not only did the defense fail
because her drum beating had attracted a crowd and frightened sev-
eral horses, but the court in Mashburn v. Bloomington5 7 also re-
marked that the First Amendment did not reach such disturbances.
The next year the same court was called upon to reassess the
Bloomington ordinance in City v. Richardson.58 This time a
husband-wife duet were acquitted, forcing the court to distinguish
Mashburn on factual grounds. Even though these Salvation Army
members also had not been licensed, their actions had not blocked
the public streets. Further, the court intimated that a municipal or-
dinance which attempted to forbid all parades per se (i.e., outright
prohibition rather than licensing) would be void. In 1891 the case of
Rich v. City of Naperville,59 completed the trilogy. Though that
city's parade permit scheme was indistinguishable from
Bloomington's, the Salvation Army defendants' convictions for un-
lawful assembly were reversed. The ramifications of such prosecu-
tions on civil liberties no longer escaped the courts:
53. "Right to Assembly," 13 Bench & Bar 7, 8 (1908) citing from the Evening Sun
editorial of April 4, 1908 and from The Outlook of April 11, 1908.
54. "The right of the people peaceably to assemble for lawful purposes existed
long before the adoption of the Constitution of the United States." U.S. v.
Cruickshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551 (1875).
55. See for example,Aron v. City of Wausaw, 74 N.W. 354 355 (Wis. S. Ct. 1898)
(tort action against city for injury incurred by exploding firecracker at Fourth of July
celebration dismissed since no violation of the city's unlawful assembly ordinance
had occurred).
56. Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 19 N.E. 224, 226 (Mass. S. Ct. 1889) (licensing
power of Boston police affirmed under police power).
57. Mashburn v. Bloomington, 32 I11. App. 245, 246 (I11. App. Ct. 1889).
58. City of Bloomington v. Richardson, 38 I11. App. 60, 65 (II1. App. Ct. 1890).
59. Rich v. City of Naperville, 42 I11. App. 222 (I11. App. Ct. 1891).
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Ever since the landing of the Pilgrims from the Mayflower the
right to assemble . . . and the right to parade in a peaceable
manner and for a lawful purpose have been fostered and re-
garded as among the fundamental rights of a free people. The
spirit of our free institutions allows great latitude in public
parades and demonstrations, whether religious, or political and
if they do not threaten the public peace, or substantially inter-
fere with the rights of others, every measure repressing them
whether by legislative enactment or municipal ordinance is an
encroachment upon fundamental and constitutional rights. 60
(emphasis added)
But the court was not content to rest its decision merely on general
libertarian principles. In addition, the arbitrary discretion vested in
local officials raised the spectre of discrimination: "If this ordinance
is held valid, then may the city council shut off the parades of those
whose notions do not suit their views and tastes in politics or religion
and permit like parades of those whose notions do." 61
Memorable for the abrupt about face which this one court
underwent over a two year span, the Rich decision was neither the
first nor most typical of those which recognized paraders' First
Amendment rights.62 The most frequently cited litigation voiding
municipal licensing schemes came from outside Illinois. Back in
1886 the Michigan Supreme Court acknowledged the Salvation
Army's right to peacefully parade with or without a permit in In re
Frazee. 63 Alluding to the social value of such group acts accruing to
participants and spectators alike, the court warned:
It is only when political, religious, social or other demon-
strations create public disturbances or operate as nuisances or
create or manifestly threaten some tangible public or private
mischief that the law interferes. 64
(emphasis added)
Other states soon followed the Michigan lead. The Kansas Supreme
Court in Anderson v. City of Wellington 65 held peaceful parades
lawful regardless of the absence of a permit, seconded the Frazee
60. Id., 223.
61. Id., 225.
62. City of Chicago v. Trotter, 136 111. 430, 432-3 (1891) (earlier state Supreme
Court decision concluding that parades were not per se actionable nuisances under
prevailing corporation principles; impermissible redelegation voided ordinance).
63. In re Frazee, 63 Mich. 396 (1886) (relied on in Trotter).
64. Id., 405.
65. Anderson v. City of Wellington, 40 Kan. 173 (1888).
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court's libertarian description of the defendant's rights, and noted
the decision's positive effect on political speech. In reversing the
Salvation Army leader's misdemeanor conviction, the court said:
"The right of the people in this state by organization to cooperate in
a common effort . . . to influence public opinion and impress their
strength upon the public mind ... has been too often exercised to be
now questioned." 66 Wisconsin followed suit, becoming the fourth
state to find similar justifications for permitting the Salvation Army
parade. The court in State v. Dering warned municipal officials that:
"The people do not hold rights as important and well-settled as the
right to assemble and have public parades ... subject to the power
of any public officer to interdict or prevent them." 67 The licensing
days of the local "petty tyrants" seemed numbered.
But change proved less sweeping. The ordinances in Frazee,
Anderson and Dering all had expressly exempted certain assemblies
(like funeral processions, fire brigades, and military marches) from
the permit requirement, and other jurisdictions found this distinction
controlling on the constitutionality of their more inclusive ordi-
nances.68 Since no equal protection challenge could be made by the
Salvation Army petitioner in In re Flaherty,69 the California Su-
preme Court affirmed his conviction on a finding of nuisance over
the vocal protest of one judge, who found Rich, Frazee, and Dering
controlling. Though Flaherty's request for the daily right to beat his
drum and parade struck even the dissenter as bizarre, he felt that the
state constitution demanded that the permit be issued.
Yet these cases, while a blow to the individual defendants, did
not mark a wholesale retreat to pre-Frazee days. Though the courts
might still reject the libertarian position, their rulings reflected a new
sensitivity to the public's interest in peaceful expression. Those de-
cisions which affirmed the police power thus took on new meaning.
Where the court was convinced that safeguards existed against ar-
bitrary, discriminatory licensing, the ordinance was upheld.7 0 But
where the court found only a pretextual use of the police power its
66. Id., 179.
67. St. ex rel Garrabad v. Dering, 84 Wis. 585, 595 (1893).
68. See, Commonwealth v. Mervis, 55 Pa. Sup. Ct. 178 (1913) (conviction reversed
on grounds of class discrimination after the court rejected the free speech defense);
Commonwealth v. Curtis, 55 Pa. Sup. Ct. 184 (1913) (all inclusive ordinance led to
conviction).
69. In re Flaherty, 38 P. 981, 983, 985 (Cal. S. Ct. 1895); see also, Roderick v.
Whitson, 22 N.Y. 858 (1889) (habeas corpus petition dismissed when village's permit
scheme upheld under corporation law).
70. See generally, City of Charetan v. Simmons, 87 Iowa 226, 233 (1893) (citing
defendant's due process rights as a potential remedy against arbitrary official action).
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exercise would be prohibited.71 Furthermore where only time, place,
and manner restrictions were imposed by the local authorities, the
courts were loathe to overturn the convictions. 2
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court faced the era's first
major prosecution of a street speaker, and the judges' concern with
the threat to the public peace posed by the speaker is evident. This
eleven year court battle, which reached the United States Supreme
Court, arose out of defendant William Davis' attempt to preach
without permit on the Boston Commons in Contravention of munic-
ipal ordinance on May 17, 1885. 71 While Justice White's Supreme
Court opinion shed no light on the free speech issue, he premised the
decision on Davis' lack of property interest in the Commons:
For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public
speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement
of the rights of a member of the public than for an owner of a
private house to forbid it in his house. 74
The Justices still refused to incorporate the limitations of the First
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore there were
no constitutional grounds for usurping the state police power, and
the majority reasoning was straightforward: there was a valid dele-
gation to the mayor and city council who had exercised their licens-
ing power reasonably to promote the general enjoyment of public
land by regulating, not prohibiting, speech.
Though Holmes, who authored the second state court decision,
had similarly rejected Davis' proprietary interests, he did briefly
touch the free speech claim. Direct restraints of public debate were
constitutionally deficient, but indirect restrictions on the mode of
expression like the Boston plan were permissible. Even though
these courts seemed oblivious to the chilling possibilities of regula-
tion, arguably the opinions did not sound the death knell for pro-
tected speech.75 Indeed free speech advocates could have read the
decisions as legitimating only general time, place, and manner re-
71. In re Gribben, 47 P. 1074, 1078 (Okla. S. Ct. 1897) (Salvation Army parade
control held not an "essential indispensible" municipal duty); Village of des Plaines
v. Poyer, 123 111. 348 (1888) (insufficient evidence that defendant's picnic-dance was a
nuisance).
72. Commonwealth v. Remmel, 48 Pittsb. L. J. 125 (Pa. Q. Sess. 1900); Mackall v.
Ratchford, 82 F.41, 42 (Cir. Ct. W. Va. 1897).
73. Commonwealth v. Davis, 140 Mass. 485 (1886), aff'd, 162 Mass. 510(1895), aff'd, 167
U.S. 43 (1897).
74. Id., 167 U.S. at 47.
75. See the Court's subsequent reading of Davis in Hague v. CIO, 387 U.S. 495,
515-16 (1939) which interpreted the ordinance as a general ban on various activities
deemed inconsistent with the general public enjoyment of the park.
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strictions. At least one contemporary observor suggested this nar-
rowing construction:
The rule of common sense and of the public interest [is] not to
allow public property set aside for one purpose to be used at the
whim of a few individuals for another purpose. 76
Thus if personal liberty forbids absolute prohibition of speech, public
order demanded its reasonable regulation.
Massachusetts had a second chance in Commonw. v. Ab-
rahams. 77 At issue was the constitutionality of another Boston ordi-
nance which delegated the licensing power to Franklin Park Com-
missioners. Despite Secretary of Central Labor Union Abrahams'
prior request for a permit, none was granted and litigation ensued
over his abbreviated July 4th speech. When Abrahams admitted at
bar (citing Davis) that such harangues would be improper in the
streets or on the Commons because of their dedication to the public
interest, he had proved too much. The Court readily extended his
argument and Davis to uphold this municipal regulation against both
the free assembly attack and an equal protection challenge. Like
swine, reasoned the Court,7 8 the public speaker could be restricted
by reasonable regulation.
Other jurisdictions also weighed the street speaker's right to
public access against the municipality's duty to promote the general
welfare, and in each socialists were silenced by the police power.
Party members Pierce and Wallace had chosen the streets of
Amsterdam, New York as their forum in contravention of a local
ordinance banning street gatherings. Sizable crowds had assembled
to hear both men, rendering these instigators guilty of breaching the
peace. Because the public right of free street access was deemed
paramount, the judges summarily rejected the First Amendment
claim.79 In Atlanta, Professor Fitts decided not to leave an audience
to chance so he distributed circulars in advance billing his speech as:
Testing a City Ordinance/Free Street Lecture on Socialism by
Professor J. L. Fitts of South Carolina. Shall we who built the
streets be deprived of their use for lawfully assembling to dis-
cuss our condition and needs? Come and see. Be early and get a
good place. Don't block the sidewalks or streets.
76. James Reynolds, "Reasonable Restrictions Upon Freedom of Speech," 9
Amer. Soc. Soc'y. 46, 56 (1914).
77. Commonwealth v. Abrahams, 156 Mass. 57 (1892).
78. Abrahams relied on Quincey v. Kennard, 151 Mass. 563 (1890) (upheld munici-
pal ordinance regulating the raising of swine).
79. People v. Wallace, 85 App. Div. 170, 172 (N.Y.S.Ct. 1903); People v. Pierce,
85 App. Div. 125 (N.Y.S.Ct. 1903).
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Fitts v. City of Atlanta, categorically denied the defendant's free
speech claim: "Professor Fitts has confused in his mind the constitu-
tional right of freedom of speech with an imaginary, though non-
existing right to hold public meetings and make speeches in the public
streets.' 80
Another socialist, Abe Sugarman, starred in a similar scenario
which opened for a short run in Minneapolis. Again the ordinance
carried the imprimater of legality because it aimed at preserving the
public order through reasonable regulation and it was upheld.8 The
subordination of radical activism to majority peace occurred also in
the /red flag parade cases. Socialists in both Massachusetts and
Michigan were forbidden the right to parade through the downtown
streets while waving their emblems on the rationale of public or-
der.82 While one can only wonder whether these socialists had not
lost more supporters than they had won for the free speech cause,
the results of the socialists' crusade must be attributed to the dislo-
cations of the era.
The socialist cases however were not unique: even defendants
freed of the radical taint were denied the unbridled right of free
speech by various carefully drafted municipal ordinances. Only the
half-mile radius around Detroit's City Hall was off-limits in Love v.
Phalen.s 3 Citing Davis, the court denied the speaker's First
Amendment challenge finding no individual proprietary interest, but
rather a public concern for order. Similar police power rationales
were cited when a Los Angeles ordinance forbidding public as-
semblies within certain districts was held to raise no constitutional
issue. 84
Such perfunctory treatment of the free speech mandate was
clearly not universal practice. A series of New York cases attest to
the judicial scrutiny more commonly applied to municipal regula-
tions. Though suffragette Maude Malone's conviction for disorderly
conduct was eventually upheld, the court defended her right at a
public political rally to verbally attack Presidential candidate, and
80. Fitts v. City of Atlanta, 49 S.E. 793, 795 (1905).
81. State V. Sugarman, 126 Minn. 477 (1914). The courts professed no illicit motive
in handling the socialist cases. "Professed" motive is used advisedly since the court
permitted cross-examination of witnesses which highlighted their socialist beliefs.
Id., 479.
82. People v. Beirnman, 154 Mich. 150 (1908) (conviction under municipal breach of
peace ordinance); Commonwealth v. Karvonen, 219 Mass. 30 (1914) (conviction
under 1913 Massachusetts statute).
83. Love v. Phalen, 87 N.W. 785, 788 (Mich. S. Ct. 1901).
84. Ex parte Thomas, 103 P. 19, 20 (Cal. Ct. Apps. 1909).
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then Governor, Woodrow Wilson.85 Only when Wilson lost patience
with her insinuations, and the meeting's chairman requested her
silence, did Malone overstep her right to political debate. The vocal
attack on another public figure, John Rockefeller, by an industrial
worker prompted his arrest for breach of the peace. Enraged by
Rockefeller's handling of labor unrest in Colorado, defendant
Sinclair organized a peaceful vigil outside the Standard oil magnate's
residence. Some participants carried a bleeding heart flag (in viola-
tion of a town ordinance), and the crowd blocked the street. In
finally affirming Sinclair's conviction the court held the combination
of various independently legal acts to be lethal:
That the conduct reprobated was reprehensible does not
legalize the act. This view does not militate against the right of
free speech or against the right of assembly nor is it primarily
for the protection of the one reprobated. Its sanction is the
public interest in the enforcement of law and the preservation of
order. 86
In both cases the mixture of conduct with pure speech had fatally
tainted the First Amendment claims. But at least the numerous free
speech cases had insured that judicial review would be a meaningful,
though not always victorious, step.
Having explored the diversity of litigation involving the conflict
between free speech and municipal ordinances, some preliminary
conclusions are in order. First, ignorance of the prevalence of the
free speech debate at the state level can no longer be countenanced.
The existence of the evidence alone suggests the need for revision of
constitutional analyses which traditionally stress the later Supreme
Court role to the detriment of earlier state developments.8 7 Further
the road toward a principled First Amendment theory had its share
of detours imposed by a society caught in the throes of cultural
change. Thus, when a court sidestepped the constitutional claim,
one of the trilogy of police power concerns (safety, health, or mor-
85. People v. Malone, 29 N.Y. Crim. Rpts. 325, 327 (N.Y.S. Ct. 1913). a sample of
the Malone-Wilson interchange:
Malone: "You have just been talking about monopolies and what about women's
suffrage? The men have a monopoly of the suffrage."
Wilson: "I'm here to discuss national not state issues."
Malone: "I'm speaking to you as an American." Id., 326.
See also, R. E. Falkner, "Free Speech and Its Limits," (Preliminary Report to the
Free Speech Commission of the National Civic Federation), 22 Case & Comment 455
(Nov. 1915).
86. People v. Sinclair, 149 N.Y. Supp. 54, 61 (1914).
87. Cf., Gerald Gunther, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law (9th ed.
1975), 104 et seq.
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als) was invariably cited. These regulatory principles had been a
traditional subject of nineteenth century jurisprudence; First
Amendment doctrines were only now being hammered out. 88 Thus
the novelty of the constitutional claims, coupled with the era's un-
derstandable fear of mass violence,89 goes far in explaining the de-
ference paid local officials.
In the wake of the 1886 Haymarket embroglio, Henry Adams
had reduced any claim of protected political expression, to sym-
bolic, but impractical rhetoric. Not only did the legal right exist to
suppress utterance that threatened public security, but courts and
local authorities had the affirmative moral duty to command the
entire free speech controversy, to "sink into oblivion." 9 0
A generation later Ernest Freund on the eve of World War I
announced the emerging constitutional theory: mere advocacy could
not be condemned. 91 Written in 1904, his treatise, The Police Power,
signalled a marked departure from the earlier approaches of Cooley
and Tiedeman. A product of a different age, Freund verified that a
heightened judicial review was appropriate when free speech con-
cerns were implicated. He counselled:
The exercise of the police power might conceivably serve the
purpose of guiding or checking intellectual movements so as to
further the ideas of the government of what is beneficial to
society or state. Such a purpose is however disclaimed by lib-
eral governments and the guaranty of freedom of religion and of
speech and press removes the pursuit of ideal interests on the
whole from the operation of the police power.92
Never oblivious to the repressive check on free speech which the
police power posed, Freund distinguished between reasonable regu-
lation and outright suppression.9 3 Individual rights could be sub-
jected to "uniform, impartial, and reasonable regulation" to insure
the general welfare, but he admitted that a society "which assigns to
88. See text, supra, n.8.
89. "Nativist resurgence" in the late 19th century is often blamed for the public's
link between radical sentiment and social violence. Such events as the economic
depression of mid-1870s, a 1877 railroad strike with federal intervention, the rise of
the Socialist Labor Party culminating in the 1886 Haymarket incident fueled the
popular view. See, for example, William Preston, Aliens and Dissenters, 1903-33
(Cambridge, 1963), 23-26.
90. Adams, supra n.44, 530.
91. Ernest Freund, The Police Power (Chicago, 1904), 513 (concluding that New





state compulsion the narrowest possible limits invites social
self-protection." 94
Even the New York City Police Commissioner proved attune to
an assemblage's constitutional rights when he ordered his force not
only to permit free speech, but also to protect its untrammelled
exercise. For him, constitutional liberty extended to the point of
actual incitement to violence, obstruction of the sidewalks, or tangi-
ble interference with the rights of others. Even his definition of
incitement to riot-" provocation of immediate violence"-forbade
the suppression of mere advocacy. 95
Lastly some attempt should be made to explain why these
cases, nearly all of which could be classified under the political
speech title, did not result in more victories for the free speech
defendant. The dichotomy repeatedly drawn in the cases between
the individual's liberty and the public interest suggests one tentative
hypothesis: the courts did not yet fully comprehend their role as
protectors of minority concerns. 96 The author of the Preliminary
Report to Free Speech Commission of the National Civic Federation
suggested just how deeply entrenched the majoritarian emphasis of
the Founding Fathers still was: "A common-sense respect for the
rights of others has embodied in the law certain restrictions on the
right of free speech .... 97 Another lawyer put it more bluntly:
I have found in a somewhat extensive examination of cases
bearing on free speech almost no instance where these alleged
mouthpieces of the people had any authority from a majority of
the people to speak for them.
98
Perhaps in an age with a strong faith in the democratic process,
repeated legitimization of the majority will by the courts made
sense. Even so, the groundwork for free speech protection had been
laid: the speech/conduct distinction surfaced; regulation rather than
prohibition was the order of the day; time, place, and manner rules
were developed; and access to the public forum became a central
issue. Though products of a different age and inclined to judge the
era's accomplishments by modem free speech standards, even we
should not fault that record.
94. Id.
95. Hon. Arthur Woods, "Reasonable Restrictions Upon Freedom of As-
semblage," 9 Amer. Soc. Soc'y 29, 30-2 (1914). See also the reactions to Wood's
address by Gilbert Roe, J. Q. Dealey and Paul Douglas, 9Amer. Soc. Soc'y 35 et seq.
96. William Nelson, "Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review," 120 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1166, 1177 (1972); cf. Wiebe, supra n.11, at 107; Murphy, supra n.1 at 286-7.
97. Falkner, supra n.88, 455.
98. Reynolds, supra n.79, at 57.
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